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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL: WHEN A
PARTY JOINS LEGAL AND EQUITABLE CLAIMS, CAN
A COURT'S ERRONEOUS DISMISSAL OF THE LEGAL
CLAIM DENY THE PARTY THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A
JURY TRIAL?
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
litigant the right to a jury trial.' Because the English often deprived the
American colonists of an opportunity for a jury trial, the framers of the
Constitution placed great importance on the right to a jury trial. 2 In drafting
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution,
adopted by the colonial states in 1791, provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, . . . the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Id.
Courts have interpreted the seventh amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial
in suits at common law to mean any suits asserting legal rights, as opposed to equitable,
maritime, and admiralty rights. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 474, 474-79 (1830); see
5 J. MOORE, J. LucAs & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11(5)-(6), at 38-78 to
38-86 (2d. ed. 1987) (stating general rule that party may demand jury trial in actions historically
at law). The seventh amendment right to a jury trial also extends to statutorily created legal
rights. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974); see 5 J. MOORE, J. LucAs & J. WICKER,
supra, 38.12(1), at 38-118 (noting that Congress statutorily may enlarge right to jury trial).
In extending the right to a jury trial to statutorily created legal rights, the United States
Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether reasoned that a claim based on the Civil Rights Act of
1968 was basically a tort claim for compensatory damages based on the defendant's breach
of a statutorily created duty. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191 (1974); see Civil Rights Act
of 1968, ch. 45, 82 Stat. 88 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)) (prohibiting discriminatory housing practices).
2. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (reasoning that
right to jury trial is of such historical importance that courts strictly should scrutinize any
infringement of that right). In analyzing the right to a jury trial, Blackstone asserted that the
concept of a civil jury trial was one of the most glorious concepts of the English law. 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379, at 1340 (1898). Thomas Jefferson believed that the civil
jury trial was a safeguard against governmental and judicial abuse of rights and, therefore,
was the only right guaranteeing that the government would operate within the principles of
the Constitution. 3 WRITINGS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON (Washington ed.) 71; see Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) & n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (analyzing importance
of jury trial to framers of United States Constitution). England's denial to the American
colonists of the right to a jury trial was an important factor in the colonies' decision to enter
the Revolutionary War. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 340 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see R. POUND,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GuARANTEEs OF LIBERTY 69-72 (1957) (explaining how
England's expansion of admiralty jurisdiction deprived Americans of trials by jury); C.
UBBELOHDE, Tan VIcE-ADMIRALTY CouRTs AND THE AM ERCAN REVOLUTION 208-11 (1960)
(recounting that because vice-admiralty courts denied American colonists Englishmen's rights,
American colonists objected to England's vice-admiralty courts). After America entered the
Revolutionary War, each of the thirteen states restored the right to a civil jury trial. See, e.g.,
GA. CONST. art. VI, § 15, para. 1 (guaranteeing right to civil jury trial); MASS. CoNsT. art.
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the seventh amendment, the framers of the Constitution sought to prevent
corruption of and state encroachment upon the right to a jury trial in civil
cases.' Certain procedural devices and administrative procedures, however,
infringe upon a litigant's right to a jury trial.4 These procedural devices
XV (giving citizens right to civil jury trial); VA. CONST. art. I § 11 (describing right to civil
jury trial as sacred); see also Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment,
57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 655 (1973) (analyzing importance of jury trial to colonial America).
The right to a civil jury trial was probably one of the only rights that the thirteen states
universally restored. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 341 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reviewing
American history of jury trial); see also L. LavY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PREss i EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1960) (noting colonial states' belief that juries
prevented governmental abuse). In Tim FEDERALIST, Alexander Hamilton even contended that
to protect the sanctity of the jury trial, juries, instead of judges, should review civil jury
verdicts that parties appealed. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 and 83 (A. Hamilton); see Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397-98 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (analyzing Alexander
Hamilton's view of civil jury trial). Alexander Hamilton, however, did not wish to include in
the Constitution the right to a civil jury trial. Tin FEDERALIST Nos. 81 and 83 (A. Hamilton).
Alexander Hamilton reasoned that states should provide their own rules and limitations for
the right to a civil jury trial, and that the right to a civil jury trial was not as critical as the
right to a criminal jury trial. Id. At the ratification debates, however, the anti-Federalists
staunchly supported the right to a civil jury trial. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789); see Parklane,
439 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (surveying framers' positions on placing right to
civil jury trial in Constitution). Consequently, following Congress' proposal, the thirteen states
ratified the seventh amendment. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Courts and commentators, however, have questioned the value of juries in civil trials. See
Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 1948) (stating that general
verdict allows jurors to insert prejudice into verdict and ignore judge's instructions on law).
Critics generally base attacks on the jury system on two points. Id. One, jury trials are time
consuming and, therefore, congest the court system. See De Parcq, Thoughts on the Civil
Jury, 3 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1966) (surveying strengths and weaknesses of civil juries). Two,
because juries are unlearned in the law, juries' decision making is often irrational and not
based on the law. Id.; see also J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
LEGAL JUSTICE 108 (1950) (commentators conflict on desirability of juries in civil trials); James,
Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 664-69 (1963) (explaining problems
that jury trials and jury waiver procedures cause in judicial systems merging law and equity);
Redish, Seventh Amendment Right To Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 502-08 (1975) (noting that juries are often incom-
petent, prejudiced, and sluggish). But see Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L.
REv. 1055, 1061, 1066 (1964) (discounting burden that juries place on judicial system and
refuting claims that juries cannot handle intricate issues).
3. See 5 J. MooRE, J. LUCAs & J. WICKER, supra note 1, 38.02, 38-14 (characterizing
jury as device to protect common man); Kalven, supra note 2, at 1069, 1075 (using study data
to determine elements that juries add to legal system); Pope, The Jury, 39 TEx. L. REv. 426,
443 (1961) (portraying function of judge and jury as one of checks and balances on government).
4. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1966) (noting that summary jurisdiction
proceedings allow court to determine legal issues before equitable issues, although court's
determination could collaterally estop jury trial of legal claim); Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372, 393 (1943) (recognizing that although plaintiff requested jury trial, directed verdict
allows court to render verdict); Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659-61
(1935) (determining that regardless of jury's verdict, judgment notwithstanding verdict enables
court to render verdict); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 321-22 (1902)
(ascertaining that although defendant requested jury trial, court may grant summary judgment);
Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 598 (1897) (holding that court may
structure factual questions for jury and render legal judgment based on law).
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and administrative procedures occasionally prevent juries from resolving
disputes and, consequently, have infringed on the seventh amendment's
guarantee of the right to a jury trial.5 Although conflicting with the seventh
amendment's guarantee to a jury trial, the procedural devices and admin-
istrative procedures, nevertheless, have withstood constitutional challenges.6
5. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between procedural
devices and right to jury trial).
6. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1966) (holding that bankruptcy summary
jurisdiction proceedings did not violate plaintiff's right to jury trial); Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372, 393 (1943) (deciding that directed verdict did not encroach upon right
to jury trial); Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659-61 (1935) (determining
that judgment notwithstanding verdict did not violate party's right to jury trial); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 321-22 (1902) (ascertaining that summary judgment
did not detract from party's right to jury trial); Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165
U.S. 593, 598 (1897) (holding that special verdict did not violate defendant's right to jury
trial).
In Katchen v. Landy the United States Supreme Court considered whether the trial court's
consideration of equitable claims before legal claims in the summary jurisdiction proceedings
of a bankruptcy action violated the plaintiff's right to a jury trial. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 328-
29. A summary jurisdiction proceeding is a provision in the Bankruptcy Act that allows a
court to dismiss claims without adhering to all of the procedures and requirements of a full
trial. See 11 U.S.C. § 502G) (1982) (granting court power to allow or disallow claims according
to equities of case). The Supreme Court held that summary jurisdiction procedures did not
violate the right to a jury trial. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 339-40. In Katchen the Supreme Court
recognized that in rare instances, a court may determine equitable issues before legal claims,
even when a court's determination of the equitable claims could collaterally estop the plaintiff
from trying his legal claim. Id. The Katchen Court reasoned that in enacting the summary
jurisdiction procedure, Congress intended to promote justice by prompt settlement of claims.
Id. at 328-29. The Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that the trial court constitutionally
may consider the equitable claim before the legal claim. Id.
In Galloway v. United States the United States Supreme Court considered whether a
directed verdict violated a party's right to a jury trial. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 393. The Galloway
Court noted that a directed verdict is a judgment that the court renders against a party, as a
matter of law, because the party has not established a prima facie case. Id. at 393. The
Supreme Court held that because a directed verdict does not infringe upon a jury's function
as fact finder, the directed verdict did not deprive the plaintiff of the right to a jury trial. Id.
at 396. The Supreme Court recognized that juries determine factual issues and judges determine
legal issues. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned, therefore, that if the plaintiff did not present
enough facts from which the jury could make reasonable inferences to resolve the factual
issues, the judge could direct the verdict as a matter of law. Id.
In Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman the United States Supreme Court considered
whether a judgment notwithstanding the verdict violated a party's right to a jury trial. Redman,
295 U.S. at 659. The Redman Court recognized that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
is a judgment that the court renders for a party regardless of the jury's verdict for the
opposing party. Id. The Redman Court recognized, further, that a court may grant a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict if, as a matter of law, the jury bases the verdict on insufficient
evidence. Id. In Redman the Supreme Court held that the judgment for the defendant
notwithstanding the jury's verdict for the plaintiff did not violate the plaintiff's right to a
jury trial. Id. at 661. The Redman Court reasoned that the seventh amendment only preserves
the right to a jury trial as the right existed at common law when the United States adopted
the seventh amendment. Id. at 657. The Court noted that when the states adopted the seventh
amendment, judgments notwithstanding the verdict existed at common law. Id. at 659-61. The
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Collateral estoppel,7 a procedural device, also may conflict with the seventh
amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial.' Collateral estoppel
typically allows a litigant to prevent the relitigation of factual issues already
determined during a previous trial. 9 Collateral estoppel, thus, promotes
judicial economy and efficiency.' 0 By allowing a litigant to invoke collateral
estoppel, however, courts occasionally may deny a litigant the right to a
Supreme Court held, therefore, that judgments notwithstanding the verdict did not violate the
seventh amendment. Id.
In Fidelity & Deposit Company v. United States the United States Supreme Court
considered whether summary judgment violated a party's right to a jury trial. Fidelity &
Deposit, 187 U.S. at 321-22. The Fidelity & Deposit Court noted that a court may grant
summary judgment if, based on the affidavits and pleadings, no issue of material fact is in
dispute. Id. The Supreme Court noted, additionally, that the law must entitle a party to
judgment before a court may grant summary judgment. Id. The Supreme Court held that
because the defendant's response affidavits did not state a defense sufficient to defeat the
plaintiff's right to recovery, summary judgment did not violate the defendant's right to a jury
trial. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the right to a jury trial does not accrue until a
factual issue is in dispute. Id.
In Walker v. New Mexico and South Pacific Railroad Company the United States Supreme
Court considered whether special verdicts violated the defendant's right to a jury trial. Walker,
165 U.S. at 595. The Walker Court acknowledged that a special verdict is a statement, given
in response to the court's questions, of the jury's specific factual findings. Id. at 596. The
Walker Court noted, further, that a court accepts the jury's factual findings and applies the
law to render a judgment. Id. In Walker the Supreme Court held that special verdicts did not
violate the petitioner's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 598. The Supreme Court
reasoned that special verdicts prevented injustice by simplifying issues before the jury. Id.
7. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (stating that collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of issues that court actually and necessarily determined in
previous cause of action); see also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942) (recognizing
that one jury trial of factual issues actually and necessarily determined constitutionally is
sufficient). In Parkane Hosiery Co. v. Shore the United States Supreme Court noted that by
invoking collateral estoppel, a party may prevent the relitigation of issues already determined
in a previous action. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326. The Parklane Court distinguished collateral
estoppel from res judicata by stating that in res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a
previous suit bars parties or persons privy to the parties from bringing a second suit based on
the same cause of action. Id. The Parklane Court recognized, therefore, that collateral estoppel
refers to the preclusion of issues, whereas res judicata refers to the preclusion of claims. Id.
The Parklane Court stated that collateral estoppel and res judicata protect litigants and
the judicial system from the needless relitigation of issues. Id.; see Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971) (res judicata prevents
litigants from harassing defendants with repeated assertions of same claims). Collateral estoppel
accomplishes at least three objectives. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law
Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1723, 1723 (1968). First, by preventing inconsistent
judgments, collateral estoppel preserves the integrity of the judicial system. Id. Second,
collateral estoppel protects litigants against the harassment of having to retry the same issue.
Id. Finally, by preventing parties from relitigating the same issues and claims, collateral
estoppel promotes judicial economy. Id.
8. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326 (analyzing whether plaintiff could use previous equitable
determination to collaterally estop relitigation of factual issues in subsequent legal claim).




trial by jury because a jury previously may not have determined a factual
issue." Courts inconsistently have determined whether trial courts that
erroneously have dismissed legal claims properly joined with equitable claims
unconstitutionally deny a plaintiff the right to a jury trial when the defen-
dant, on remand of the erroneously dismissed legal claim, invokes collateral
estoppel to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating a factual issue previously
determined in the equitable, non-jury claim.'
12
In Parklane Hosiery Company v. Shore3 the United States Supreme
Court considered whether collateral estoppel unconstitutionally infringes on
the right to a jury trial.' 4 In Parklane the plaintiff attempted to invoke
collateral estoppel to prevent the defendant, who did not have a right to a
jury trial in the previous litigation, from relitigating in a legal action previous
nonjury determinations. 5 The plaintiff in Parklane, however, was not a
I1. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) (reasoning that
when party joins legal and equitable claims, courts sometimes may try equitable claim first
even if collateral estoppel could prevent jury trial of facts underlying legal claim); infra note
19 (discussing Beacon Court's holding that party does not lose right to jury trial by joining
legal and equitble claims).
12. Compare Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 356-57 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that by barring relitigation in retrial of issues common to plaintiffs legal and
equitable claims, collateral estoppel violated plaintiffs right to jury trial) with Ritter v. Mount
St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that by barring relitigation in
retrial of issues common to plaintiff's legal and equitable claims, collateral estoppel did not
violate plaintiff's right to jury trial), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 260 (1987) and Swentek v.
USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 563 (4th Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply Ritter court holding if
original trial court clearly did not intend factual findings of equitable claim to preclude new
trial of legal claim).
13. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
14. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
15. Id. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
obtained a declaratory judgment against Parklane Hosiery, Inc. (Parklane) in a non-jury trial.
Id. at 325. A declaratory judgment is a binding adjudication in equity on the rights or status
of a party that is conclusive as to subsequent actions between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §
2201 (1982) (courts may, with effect of final judgment, declare rights of any party seeking
declaration). Shore, the plaintiff, subsequently, brought a class action suit against Parklane.
ParkMane, 439 U.S. at 324. Claiming that determinations from the declaratory judgment
collaterally estopped the plaintiff from relitigating the issues of the SEC action, the SEC
sought a partial summary judgment. Id. at 325. The district court, however, denied the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Id. The district court reasoned that collateral estoppel
would deny the defendant the right to a jury trial. Id. The plaintiff appealed the district
court's denial of the motion for summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second for summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Id. The Second Circuit reversed the district court. Id. The Second Circuit reasoned
that because the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the SEC
action, no issues remained for jury determination in the subsequent class action. Id.
The United States Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari. Id. The Parkane Court
considered, first, whether irrespective of the seventh amendment, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel permitted the plaintiff's invocation of collateral estoppel. Id. at 326. The Parklane
Court recognized that courts generally prohibit collateral estoppel when, in certain situations,
collateral estoppel would be unfair to the opposing party. Id. at 326-27. The Parklane Court
recognized, further, that to promote fairness in the litigation of claims, courts at common law
19881
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party to the litigation of the previous equitable claim. 6 The Parklane Court
held that the plaintiffs invocation of collateral estoppel did not violate the
defendant's right to a jury trial. 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that an
equitable determination constitutionally could collaterally estop the reliti-
gation of factual issues in a subsequent legal claim. 8 The Parklane Court
noted, however, that when a party joins legal and equitable claims, the
district court always should exercise discretion to preserve the right to a
jury trial of the facts underlying the legal claim.' 9
required mutuality before allowing a party to invoke collateral estoppel. Id. The Supreme
Court noted that mutuality required that for a party to invoke collateral estoppel in the current
suit, both parties had to be the identical parties in the previous suit. Id. In Parklane the
Supreme Court recognized that by attempting to preclude the defendant from relitigating an
issue that the defendant previously and unsuccessfully had litigated in an action to which the
plaintiff was not a party, the plaintiff offensively invoked collateral estoppel. Id. The Parklane
Court reasoned, therefore, that offensive collateral estoppel is nonmutual. Id. The Parklane
court disposed, however, of collateral estoppel's requirement of mutuality and permitted the
use of offensive collateral estoppel. See id. (stating that Supreme Court already had abandoned
mutuality of estoppel); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971) (rejecting mutuality by permitting nonmutual, defensive collateral
estoppel).
In addition to reasoning that the invocation of nonmutual collateral estoppel was consti-
tutional, the Parklane Court reasoned that because the defendant had incentive vigorously to
litigate the SEC action, the plaintiff fairly could invoke collateral estoppel. Parklane, 439 U.S.
at 332. The Parklane Court noted, however, that courts still need to examine whether a party's
invocation of collateral estoppel would be unfair to the opposing party. Id. at 331-32. The
Parklane Court, subsequently, gave examples of factors for courts to consider that would
render unfair a party's invocation of offensive collateral estoppel. Id. at 331-32. The Parklane
Court noted, first, that if the first suit for damages was small and the defendant had little
incentive to defend vigorously, the invocation of collateral estoppel may be unfair. Id. at 330.
The Parklane Court noted, second, that when the defendant has previous favorable judgments
on the issue, the invocation of collateral estoppel may be unfair because the courts already
have recognized the validity of the defendant's position. Id. The Parklane Court noted, third,
that when procedural opportunities that readily could cause a different result were unavailable
'o the defendant in the first cause of action, the use of collateral estoppel may be unfair. Id.
at 330-31.
16. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326.
17. Id. at 337.
18. Id. at 334; see Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) (stating
that equitable determination could collaterally estop relitigation of issues in subsequent legal
claim); infra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Beacon Court's holding that courts
should attempt to preserve right to jury trial).
19. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331; Beacon, 359 U.S. at 505. In Beacon the United States
Supreme Court considered whether if the trial court conducted a bench trial on the facts
common to properly joined legal and equitable claims, the trial court violated a party's right
to a jury trial. Id. The plaintiff in Beacon brought an antitrust action, and in response, the
defendant sought a declaratory judgment to settle pivotal issues of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at
503. The plaintiff's antitrust action was a legal claim and the defendant's action for a
declaratory judgment was an equitable claim. Id. at 502-04. Because of the legal claim, the
plaintiff demanded a jury trial. Id. at 503; see supra note 1 and accompanying text (seventh
amendment guarantees right to jury trial on legal claims). The district court, however, in
equity and without a jury, first tried the declaratory judgment action and found for the
defendant. Beacon, 359 U.S. at 503-04. The plaintiff, however, unsuccessfully appealed to the
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In Parklane the defendant contended that because the plaintiff was not
a party to the first litigation, the plaintiff's invocation of collateral estoppel
would be unconstitutional. 20 The Parklane Court noted that the Supreme
Court traditionally had used an historical analysis to determine the scope
of a party's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. 21 The Parklane Court
recognized, furthermore, that the common-law concept of mfituality of
estoppel required that to invoke collateral estoppel, the parties in the current
suit had to be the identical parties in the previous suit.22 The Parklane
Court, however, stating that the Supreme Court never rigidly has applied
the strict historical approach to interpret the seventh amendment, rejected
the strict historical analysis advocated by the defendant. 23 The Parklane
Court, noting that many procedural devices have affected the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial, reasoned that the seventh amendment
preserves only the substance of the right to a jury trial. 24 The seventh
amendment's purpose is to preserve the jury's function of determining
factual issues. 25 The Supreme Court stated, furthermore, that the concerns
of judicial economy may outweigh the importance of trying the facts before
a jury.26 The Parklane Court held, therefore, that an equitable determination
constitutionally could collaterally estop the relitigation of factual issues in
a subsequent legal claim.27
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the
district court to set aside the declaratory judgment. Id. at 501. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and held that to prevent collateral estoppel and preserve the plaintiffs
right to a jury trial of the legal claim, the district court first should dispose of the plaintiffs
legal claim. Id. at 501, 510. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the Constitution
preserves the right to a jury trial, the district court should preserve, whenever possible, a
party's right to a jury trial. Id. at 510. The Supreme Court stated, furthermore, that a court
should deny a party the opportunity to a jury trial of the factual issues in only the most
extreme circumstances. Id. at 510-11.
20. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326.
21. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (stating that general purpose of
seventh amendment was to preserve right to jury trial as right to jury trial existed in 1791);
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1973) (defining scope of right to jury trial by
referring to right as right to jury trial existed in 1791); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S.
372, 388-92 (1943) (reasoning that seventh amendment secures only fundamental substance of
right to jury trial existing in 1791). The purpose of the United States Supreme Court's use of
the historical analysis was to define the scope of the right to jury trial as the right existed in
1791 when the colonial states adopted the seventh amendment. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293
U.S. 474, 476 (1935) (determining scope of seventh amendment with 1791 as reference point);
Wolfram, supra note 2, at 642 (analyzing historical test for determining scope of seventh
amendment).
22. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326-27.
23. Id. at 336-37.
24. Id.; see supra note 4 and 6 and accompanying text (discussing cases eroding seventh
amendment right to jury trial).
25. See Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (holding that
judgment notwithstanding verdict does not violate right to jury trial); supra notes 4 and 6 and
accompanying text (explaining Redman Court's reasoning that seventh amendment right to
jury trial should preserve juries' fact-finding function).
26. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 335.
27. Id. at 337.
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Since Parklane the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have
considered the constitutionality of an application of collateral estoppel that
diminishes a party's right to a jury trial. 28 In Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor
Truck Co.29 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered whether the defendant constitutionally could invoke collateral
estoppel to deny the plaintiff the right to a jury trial on a claim arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30 In Hussein the plaintiff,
an Egyptian, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin and alleged that employees of the defendant made
ethnic slurs against the plaintiff.3' The plaintiff claimed that the defendant-
employer was responsible for derogatory ethnic references that violated both
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,32 and section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.13 Because the section 1981 claim was a legal claim, the
plaintiff demanded a jury trial.3 4 The Title VII claim, however, was an
equitable claim and accrued no right to a jury trial.3 5 On the defendant's
motion, the district court in Hussein dismissed the plaintiff's section 1981
claim.36 The district court ruled that section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 applied only to blacks. 37 Because the remaining Title VII claim was
an equitable claim to which the right to a jury trial did not attach, the
district court, consequently, conducted a bench trial on the Title VII claim.
38
At trial the district court found for the defendant.
39
28. See Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 1987)
(determinihg whether defendant's invocation of collateral estoppel violated plaintiff's right to
jury trial); Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1987) (considering
whether defendant constitutionally could invoke collateral estoppel), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
260 (1987); but cf. Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 563 (4th Cir. 1987) (refusing to
apply Ritter court's holding if original trial court clearly did not intend factual findings of
equitable claim to preclude new trial of legal claim).
29. 816 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1987).
30. Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Co., 816 F.2d 348, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1987).
31. Id.
32. Civil Rights Act of 1964, ch. 88, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1982)).
33. Hussein, 816 F.2d at 350; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1996 (1982)). In Hussein the plaintiff based the Title VII claim
and the section 1981 claim on allegations of ethnic slurs. Hussein, 816 F.2d at 353.
34. Hussein, 816 F.2d at 350; see supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining that
right to jury trial exists for statutorily created legal rights).
35. Hussein, 816 F.2d at 350.
36. Id. at 350.
37. Id. In Hussein because the plaintiff was Egyptian and the district court believed that
section 1981 only protected blacks, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's section 1981
claim. Id. at 352.
38. Id. at 350-51. In Hussein the district court reasoned that because only the equitable
Title VII claim remained for trial, the plaintiff no longer had a right to a jury trial. Id. The
district court reasoned, further, that the seventh amendment guarantees a plaintiff the right
to a jury trial only on the legal claim. Id.; see supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting
that right to jury trial only extends to legal claims).
39. Hussein, 816 F.2d at 351.
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The plaintiff, subsequently, appealed the district court's dismissal of
the section 1981 claim and denial of the plaintiff's right to a jury trial to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.4 On appeal
the Seventh Circuit in Hussein ruled that the district court erred in dismissing
the plaintiff's section 1981 claim.4' The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects not only blacks, but also other minorities,
including Egyptians. 42 The defendant asserted, however, that regardless of
the district court's erroneous dismissal of the section 1981 claim, the district
court's factual determinations on the plaintiff's Title VII claim collaterally
estopped any further litigation in the section 1981 claim of the factual
determinations made in the Title VII action.43 The defendant urged, there-
fore, the Seventh Circuit to dismiss the section 1981 claim because the
factual determinations from the Title VII claim destroyed the plaintiff's
prima facie case on the section 1981 claim.44 The Seventh Circuit in Hussein
held, however, that collateral estoppel did not bar the plaintiff from
relitigating before a jury the issues common to both the Title VII and
section 1981 claims.
45
In holding that the defendant's invocation of collateral estoppel would
violate the plaintiff's right to a jury trial on the section 1981 claim, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that if the district court had not erroneously
dismissed the section 1981 claim, the plaintiff would have had a right to a
jury trial of the factual allegations underlying the section 1981 claim and
the Title VII claim. 46 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that because the
plaintiff had a right to a jury trial on the factual issues underlying the legal
claim, joinder of the legal claim and the equitable claim did not destroy
the plaintiff's right to a jury trial of the legal claim. 47 The Seventh Circuit
recognized, further, that when a plaintiff joins legal and equitable claims,
the district court rarely should deny the plaintiff a jury trial on the factual
issues underlying the legal claim.
48
After determining that the plaintiff had a right to a jury trial on the
section 1981 claim, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the defendant's
invocation of collateral estoppel would violate the defendant's right to a
jury trial on the remanded section 1981 claim.4 9 In reconciling the infringe-
ment of the plaintiff's right to a jury trial with the benefit of collateral
estoppel to judicial economy, the Hussein court stated that no previous,
40. Id.
41. Id. at 352.
42. Id. In Hussein the Seventh Circuit held that because the plaintiff's complaint stated
that he was an Egyptian and not a member of the white race, the district court should not
have dismissed the plaintiff's section 1981 claim. Id.
43. Id. at 353.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 356-57.
46. Id. at 354.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 355.
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valid judgment existed on which the defendant could base collateral estop-
pel.5 0 The Seventh Circuit recognized that courts constitutionally may permit
a party to use a previous, valid determination of an equitable claim to
collaterally estop the relitigation of the same issue." The Seventh Circuit
reasoned, however, that because the wrong trier of fact determined the
factual issues identical to both the Title VII claim and the section 1981
claim, the district court's judgment on the equitable Title VII claim was
invalid.5 2 The Seventh Circuit reasoned, further, that the joinder of the
legal and equitable claims was compulsory because the factual allegations
underlying the section 1981 claim and the Title VII claim were identical and
res judicata would have barred a subsequent claim if the plaintiff had not
brought the claims in the same action.5 3 The Seventh Circuit concluded,
50. Id. at 354.
51. Id. at 355-56; see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (holding
that equitable determination could collaterally estop relitigation of issues that court determined
in subsequent legal action); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, Inc., 359 U.S. 500, 510-11
(1959) (holding that joinder of legal and equitable claims does not destroy right to jury trial);
supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (explaining Parklane Court's reasoning that plaintiff
retains right to jury when joining legal claim and equitable claim); supra note 16 and
accompanying text (discussing Beacon court's rationale that when joining legal and equitable
claims, plaintiff retains right to jury trial of legal claim).
52. Hussein 816 F.2d at 356; see Bouchet v. National Urban League, Inc., 730 F.2d
799, 803-04 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Bouchet v. National Urban League, Inc. the plaintiff joined
a Title VII equitable claim with legal state claims that gave the plaintiff the right to demand
a jury trial of the facts underlying the state claims. Id. at 802. The district court, however,
dismissed the state claims for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 802-03. The district court, consequently,
conducted a bench trial of the Title VII claim and found for the plaintiff. Id. at 803. The
plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of the state claims to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. On appeal the Bouchet court noted that
the plaintiff based the state claims and the Title VII claim on the same factual issues. Id. The
Bouchet court recognized, consequently, that the plaintiff would have had a right to a jury
trial of the factual issues common to both the state claims and the Title VII claim. Id. The
Bouchet court reasoned, therefore, that if the district court erroneously dismissed the state
claims, a retrial before a jury of the state claims and Title VII claim would be necessary. Id.
at 803-04. The Bouchet court's reasoning, however, was in dicta because the Bouchet court
ultimately decided that the district court erroneously did not dismiss the state claims. Id. at
805-06. The Bouchet court reasoned that the district court properly declined pendent jurisdiction
over the state claims. Id.
53. Hussein, 816 F.2d at 356. In Hussein the Seventh Circuit employed the "same
transaction test" to determine whether a party's joinder of claims was compulsory. Id.; see,
e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
res judicata barred all claims arising from same transaction, but not brought in first cause of
action); Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
previous valid judgment barred same parties from relitigating claims that party brought or
could have brought in previous action), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986); Harper Plastics,
Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 657 F.2d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that res judicata
barred any grounds for recovery that party could have, but did not present in previous action).
Under the same transaction test, res judicata bars a party from again bringing not only the
same cause of action, but also any cause of action that arises from the same core of operative
facts. Alexander, 773 F.2d at 854. The United States Supreme Court also has held that res
judicata bars parties from relitigating claims that the party could have raised in the first cause
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therefore, that the plaintiff had a right to a jury trial on the factual issues
underlying the remanded section 1981 claim.
4
In addition to protecting the plaintiff's right to a jury trial, the Seventh
Circuit in Hussein determined that because the plaintiff had a right to a
jury trial on the remanded legal claim, the defendant's invocation of
collateral estoppel would not needlessly burden judicial economy 5 The
Seventh Circuit recognized that the district court's erroneous dismissal of
the section 1981 claim deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity for a jury
trial.5 6 The Seventh Circuit reasoned, therefore, that the relitigation of the
factual issues of the Title VII claim in a trial of the remanded section 1981
claim was not needless.5 7 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged, furthermore,
that by protecting the plaintiff's right to a jury trial of the factual issues
underlying the remanded legal claim, the court would not burden judicial
economy any more than in other situations in which the district court
commits a legal error requiring a retrial.5 8 In rejecting the defendant's
contention that collateral estoppel should preclude the plaintiff from retrying
the section 1981 claim, the Hussein court stated that the defendant's
constitutional right to a jury trial outweighed the resulting burden on judicial
economy. 59 The Seventh Circuit in Hussein held, therefore, that the defen-
dant could not constitutionally invoke collateral estoppel
0
Disagreeing with the outcome in Hussein, in Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's
College ,61 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
determined that to prevent the relitigation of factual issues determined in
an equitable claim, the defendant constitutionally could invoke collateral
estoppel. 62 In Ritter the defendant, a private, religious, educational institu-
tion, denied the plaintiff professorial tenure.63 The plaintiff, subsequently,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
and alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,64 the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA),65 and the Age Discrimination in
of action. See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (analyzing
proper application of res judicata). In Hussein because the plaintiff based both claims on the
employees' derogatory ethnic references, res judicata forced the plaintiff to join the Title VII
claim and the section 1981 claim. Hussein, 816 F.2d at 356.





59. Id. at 356-57.
60. Id.
61. 814 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1987).
62. See Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1987)
(concluding that defendant's invocation of collateral estoppel was constitutional).
63. Id. at 988.
64. Civil Rights Act of 1964, ch. 88, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1982)).
65. Fair Labor Standard Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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Employment Act (ADEA) 66 Because the EPA and ADEA claims were legal
claims, the plaintiff demanded a jury trial.67 The district court dismissed,
however, the EPA and the ADEA claims on the grounds that the EPA and
the ADEA do not apply to religious institutions. 68 Because the district court
dismissed the legal claims and only the equitable Title VII claim remained,
the defendant successfully moved the district court to strike the plaintiff's
request for a jury trial.6 9 At trial the district court, sitting as the fact finder,
found for the defendant on the remaining Title VII claim.7 0 The plaintiff,
consequently, appealed the district court's dismissal of the EPA and ADEA
claims and the district court's judgment for the defendant on the Title VII
claim to the Fourth Circuit. 71 On appeal the Fourth Circuit ruled that
because the EPA and the ADEA claims applied to religious institutions,
the district court erroneously had dismissed both the EPA and ADEA
claims. 72 The Fourth Circuit remanded, therefore, the EPA and ADEA
claims to the district court.
7
1
On remand the defendant contended that because the trial judge origi-
nally made factual determinations that collaterally estopped the plaintiff
from relitigating factual issues essential to the plaintiff's prima facie case
on the EPA and ADEA claims, summary judgment was proper. 74 The
66. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 989 (alleging that defendant denied plaintiff tenure on basis
of age and sex); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), ch. 90, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) (prohibiting
discriminatory employment practices based on age or sex).
67. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 989; see supra note 1 and accompanying text (stating that plaintiff
has right to jury trial on statutorily created legal claims).
68. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 989. In Ritter the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Title
VII claim, the EPA claim, and the ADEA claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Id. The district court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment. Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the trial court discretion to treat a
12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment. FaD. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district
court may grant a party's motion for summary judgment if no issue of material fact remains
for trial and the law entitles the moving party to a judgment. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c). The
district court dismissed the ADEA claim and EPA claim based on the erroneous belief that
the EPA and ADEA do not apply to religious institutions. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 989. The district
court, however, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the Title VII claim. Id.
69. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 989; see supra note 1 and accompanying text (stating that plaintiff
has right to jury trial on statutorily created legal claims, but not on equitable claims).
70. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 989. In Ritter the district court found both that the plaintiff was





74. Id. at 989-90. The Ritter court stated that to establish a prima facie case on the
ADEA claim, the plaintiff must establish four elements. Id. at 992. The Ritter court noted
that, first, the plaintiff must show membership in a protected class. Id. The Ritter court noted
that, second, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff had qualifications for tenure. Id. The
Ritter court noted that, third, the plaintiff must show that despite the plaintiff's qualifications,
the college rejected the plaintiff for tenure. Id. The Ritter court noted that, finally, the
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plaintiff requested, however, that to prevent the defendant from collaterally
estopping the plaintiff from trying the EPA and ADEA claims before a
jury, the district court should vacate the judgment on the Title VII claim.
75
Reasoning that a district court does not have authority to vacate a judgment
that a circuit court has affirmed, the district court denied the plaintiff's
request to vacate the judgment. 76 The district court granted, therefore, the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed, accordingly, the
EPA and ADEA claims. The district court reasoned that the factual
findings from the Title VII action collaterally estopped the plaintiff from
establishing the ADEA and EPA claims. 78 The plaintiff in Ritter, subse-
quently, appealed the constitutionality of the defendant's invocation of
collateral estoppel to the Fourth Circuit. 79 On appeal the plaintiff contended
that the defendant's invocation of collateral estoppel violated the plaintiff's
right to a jury trial of the facts underlying the EPA and ADEA claims.8 0
On appeal the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court's factual
determinations from the original trial on the plaintiff's Title VII claim
constitutionally could collaterally estop the plaintiff from relitigating on
remand the factual issues of the EPA and ADEA claims.81 The Fourth
Circuit acknowledged that an equity court's factual determinations consti-
tutionally could collaterally estop a jury from making in a subsequent legal
action the same factual determinations.12 The Fourth Circuit in Ritter
plaintiff must show that after rejecting the plaintiff for tenure, the college continued seeking
applicants for the position. Id. The Ritter court stated, further, that to establish a prima facie
case on the EPA claim, the plaintiff must prove that, unless the defendant based the pay
differential on a factor other than sex, the defendant paid the plaintiff less wages than the
defendant paid other employees for the same work. Id. at 993. The Ritter court noted that in
the plaintiff's initial trial, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs Title VII claim because
the district court found that the plaintiff was not qualified for tenure and that a co-worker
was more qualified for tenure than the plaintiff. Id. The Ritter court reasoned, therefore, that
if the court collaterally estopped the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of whether she was
qualified for tenure, the plaintiff could not establish a ADEA prima facie case. Id. The Ritter
court stated, similarly, that the plaintiff could not establish an EPA prima facie case because
the district court's finding that the college did not deny tenure on the basis of sex collaterally
estopped relitigation on the issue of sexual discrimination. Id.
75. Id. at 990.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing Ritter court's deter-
mination that findings from Title VII action destroyed prima facie EPA and ADEA claims).
79. Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 990 (4th Cir. 1987).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 992.
82. Id. at 990; see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (holding
that equitable determinations can collaterally estop party from relltigating same issues in
subsequent legal action); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 338-40 (1966) (holding that if
statutory scheme provides for prompt nonjury determination of issues and party joins legal
and equitable claims, court first does not have to try legal claim); supra notes 13-17 and
accompanying text (explaining Parklane Court's holding that equitable determination consti-
tutionally could collaterally estop relitigation of factual issues in subsequent legal claim); supra
note 6 (discussing Katchen court's rationale that right to jury trial applies to statutorily created
legal claims).
19881
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:271
recognized, further, that if the district court erroneously had not dismissed
the EPA and ADEA claims, the seventh amendment would have guaranteed
the plaintiff a jury trial on the EPA and ADEA claims. 83 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned, therefore, that joinder of legal and equitable claims does
not destroy the right to a jury trial on the factual issues underlying the
legal claim.14 The Fourth Circuit recognized, further, that if a plaintiff joins
legal and equitable claims the district court rarely should deny the plaintiff's
right to a jury trial by first trying the equitable claim.85 The Fourth Circuit
stated, however, that although district courts always should try to preserve
the right to a jury trial of legal claims when a plaintiff joins legal and
equitable claims, the preservation of the right to a jury trial is only a
general prudential rule.
8 6
After noting that an equitable determination can collaterally estop the
relitigation of issues in a subsequent legal action, the Ritter court acknowl-
edged that the judicial system has a strong interest in the quick, efficient
resolution of issues.8 7 The Ritter court noted that if the defendant could
not invoke collateral estoppel, either the district court would need to conduct
a retrial of the factual issues underlying the legal claim, or the Fourth
Cicuit would have to hear an interlocutory appeal on the district court's
dismissal of the legal claim. 88 The Ritter court reasoned, therefore, that by
not allowing the defendant to invoke collateral estoppel, the courts exces-
sively would burden judicial economy.8 9 The Fourth Circuit reasoned, fur-
thermore, that by requiring a retrial of the factual issues common to both
the legal claim and equitable claim, the courts would discourage the parties
from enthusiastically litigating the equitable claim.9 The Fourth Circuit
recognized, moreover, that the harm of denying the plaintiff a jury trial
83. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 990.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) (holding. that
joinder of legal and equitable claims does not destroy right to jury trial); supra note 19 and
accompanying text (explaining Beacon court's reasoning that plaintiff retains right to jury trial
when joining legal and equitable claims).
86. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 990.
87. Id. at 991.
88. Id. In Ritter the Fourth Circuit stated that by granting a plaintiff a new jury trial
on the issues already determined by the bench, the court excessively would burden judicial
economy. Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if a plaintiff joins legal and equitable claims
and the district court dismisses the legal claim, either the plaintiff could burden the judicial
system by making an interlocutory appeal, or the trial could proceed with the possibility that
the circuit court would require a retrial of the factual issues common to both the legal and
equitable claim. Id. Title 28 of the United States Code grants the circuit courts of appeals the
discretion to review any interlocutory appeal, if an appeal is otherwise not available to a
party, and an immediate appeal materially would advance the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(h) (1982).
The Fourth Circuit stated that an interlocutory appeal would delay the trial and effectively
force the parties to argue the merits of the case before the appeals court. Ritter, 814 F.2d at
991.
89. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991.
90. Id.
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does not override the judicial interest in the speedy resolution of disputes. 91
The Fourth Circuit determined, therefore, that a previous judicial determi-
nation of the facts in the original Title VII claim collaterally estopped the
plaintiff from relitigating the same facts in the trial on remand of the EPA
and ADEA claims. 92 The Fourth Circuit concluded, consequently, that
because the district court already had determined factual issues essential to
the plaintiff's prima facie case on both the EPA and ADEA claims, the
district court properly granted summary judgment on the EPA and ADEA
claims. 93
The Seventh Circuit in Hussein and the Fourth Circuit in Ritter disagree
on whether the seventh amendment right to a jury trial is more important
than collateral estoppel's judicial economy. 94 Because both the Seventh
Circuit and Fourth Circuit each rendered a directly opposing decision on
the constitutionality of the defendants' invocation of collateral estoppel, the
strengths of each circuit's rationale are the weaknesses of the other circuit's
rationale. 95 The Hussein rationale safeguards a litigant's constitutional right
91. Id. In Ritter the Fourth Circuit deferred to the Supreme Court's holding in Parkiane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore that when an equity court already has determined issues, the judicial
interest in quick and efficient resolution of issues outweighs the plaintiff's right to have a jury
resolve identical issues in a subsequent legal claim. Id.; see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (recognizing that factual determinations from equitable action
constitutionally could collaterally estop relitigation of identical issues in subsequent legal claim);
supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text (explaining Parklane Court's holding that equitable
determinations constitutionally cpuld collaterally estop party from relitigating same issues in
subsequent legal action).
92. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 994.
93. Id. at 992-94; see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (discussing Ritter court's
analysis of effect that collateral estoppel would have on plaintiff's prima facie ADEA and
EPA claims); but cf. Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 563 (4th Cir. 1987) (refusing to
apply Ritter court's holding if original trial court clearly did not intend factual findings of
equitable clalim to preclude new trial of legal claim). In Swentek v. USAIR, Inc. the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized the court's holding in Ritter, but
refused to apply the Ritter holding to the facts of Swentek. Id. In Swentek the trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's equitable Title VII claim, but the jury found for the plaintiff on a
legal emotional distress claim. Id. at 554. The trial court, however, set aside the jury's findings
and ordered a new trial on the emotional distress claim. Id. In the new trial the trial court
entered a directed verdict for the defendant after the plaintiff had presented evidence on the
emotional distress claim. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of the
directed verdict to the Fourth Circuit. Id. In reversing the directed verdict on the emotional
distress claim, the Fourth Circuit noted that the trial court's findings in the original trial,
which resulted in a dismissal of the plaintiff's Title VII claim, could not collaterally estop the
plaintiff's emotional distress claim in the second trial. Id. at 563. The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that because the original trial court ordered a new trial of the plaintiff's emotional distress
claim, the original trial court could not have intended the findings on the Title VII claim to
preclude the plaintiff's emotional distress claim. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated, therefore, that
in allowing the original trial court's findings on the equitable Title VII claim to collaterally
estop a new trial of the plaintiff's legal emotional distress claim, the court would contradict
the original trial court's intentions. Id.
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to a jury trial96 and recognizes as compulsory the plaintiff's joinder of
claims. 97 The Ritter rationale, however, promotes judicial economy 98 and
encourages parties enthusiastically to litigate claims. 99
By allowing the plaintiff to retry the factual issues before a jury, the
Hussein rationale safeguards the constitutional guarantee of the right to a
jury trial100 The history of the Constitution evidences the sanctity of the
right to a jury trial.' 0' Citizens of the United States value the jury trial
because England had denied colonists the English right to a jury trial. 0 2
England's denial of the colonist's right to a jury trial was a principal reason
for the Revolutionary War. 03 Thomas Jefferson, one of the framers of the
Constitution, believed that because juries of citizens decided whether a
defendant had violated the plaintiff's rights, the civil jury trial guarded
citizens against the governmental and judicial abuse of personal rights.-w
Thomas Jefferson concluded, therefore, that the right to a jury trial guar-
anteed that the government would operate within the principles of the
Constittion. 10s
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized the importance
of the right to a jury trial.' ° 6 Because a jury could decide differently than
a judge, the Supreme Court has stated that the availability of a jury as fact
96. See infra notes 100-17 and accompanying text (stating and analyzing advantages of
Hussein rationale that protect right to jury trial).
97. See Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 349, 356 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating
that plaintiff's joinder of claims was compulsory); supra note 53 and accompanying text
(noting Hussein court's recognition that plaintiff based legal and equitable claims on identical
facts); infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (analyzing importance of compulsory joinder
in determining whether collateral estoppel violates right to jury trial).
98. See Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 991 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that concerns of judicial economy can outweigh importance of jury trial), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 260 (1987); supra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining manner in which Ritter
rationale promotes judicial economy); infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial economy as advantage of Ritter rationale).
99. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991-92 (ruling that when plaintiff joins legal and equitable
claims and district court erroneously dismisses legal claim, equitable determination constitu-
tionally could collaterally estop, on remand of legal claim, relitigation of facts common to
both legal and equitable claims); supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing Ritter
court's listing of advantages of holding); infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text (stating
that Seventh Circuit's holding in Ritter encourages parties vigorously to litigate claims).
100. See Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 356 (7th Cir. 1987)
(discussing Hussein court's protection of right to jury trial); supra notes 49-60 and accompa-
nying text (stating that Hussein rationale protects right to jury trial).
101. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutional history of right to
jury trial).
102. Id. (discussing nonjury procedures of England's vice-admiralty courts).
103. Id. (noting that vice-admiralty courts' nonjury procedures were major impetus for
American Revolution).
104. Id. (explaining importance of jury trial to framers of Constitution).
105. Id. (discussing Thomas Jefferson's view of right to jury trial as safeguard of
constitutional principles).
106. Id. note 2 (discussing judicial view of importance of right to jury trial).
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finder could be determinative of the outcome of the trial.'07 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution not only guarantees the
right to a jury trial of traditional legal claims, but also guarantees the right
to a jury trial on statutorily created legal claims. 08 Consequently, by
statutorily creating new legal claims, Congress effectively enlarges the right
to a jury trial.'09 By reasoning, therefore, that the constitutional guarantee
of the right to a jury trial was more important than collateral estoppel's
judicial efficiency, the Hussein rationale protects the constitutional guarantee
of the right to a jury trial." 0
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Parklane recognized that if a
plaintiff joins legal and equitable claims, a trial court has limited discretion
in determining the sequence of trial to preserve the plaintiff's right to have
a jury trial of the facts common to both the legal and equitable claims."
In balancing judicial economy against the infringement on the right to a
jury trial, however, the Hussein court recognized that when a plaintiff joins
legal and equitable claims, courts rarely should exercise discretion to deny
the plaintiff the right to a jury trial on the legal claim." 2 The Hussein court
reasoned, furthermore, that the district court's erroneous dismissal of the
legal claim effectively was an abuse of judicial discretion."' Therefore, by
107. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 353 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating that jury trial is procedural opportunity that could change trial outcome);
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-539 (1958) (holding that, in personal
injury cases, trial by jury instead of by judge could be determinative of trial result). But see
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332 n.19 (stating that presence or absence of jury is basically neutral
to trial outcome).
108. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (ruling that right to jury trial attaches
to statutorily created legal claims); supra note 1 (explaining Curtis Court's holding that
Congress statutorily may enlarge right to jury trial).
109. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (stating that by statutorily creating legal
claims, Congress enlarges right to jury trial).
110. See Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 349, 356 (7th Cir. 1987)
(determining that importance of right to jury trial prevented defendant from invoking collateral
estoppel); supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (discussing Hussein court's consideration
of judicial economy and right to jury trial).
111. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 334 (1979) (noting that when
plaintiff joins legal and equitable claims, courts should protect right to jury trial of legal
claim); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) (ruling that to prevent
collateral estoppel and preserve plaintiff's right to jury trial of legal claim, district court first
should dispose of plaintiff's legal claim); supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing
Parklane Court's statement that courts should exercise discretion to protect right to jury trial);
supra note 19 (discussing Beacon Court's holding that when plaintiff joins legal and equitable
claims, courts first should dispose of legal claims).
112. See Hussein, 816 F.2d at 354 (noting that under normal circumstances, in joined
legal and equitable action, courts always should resolve legal claim before equitable claim);
supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (discussing Hussein court's rationale for exercising
discretion to protect right to jury trial).
113. See Hussein, 816 F.2d at 354-55 (discussing effects of district court's erroneous
dismissal of legal claim); supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (explaining Hussein court's
rationale for not allowing district court's abuse of discretion to deny plaintiff jury trial on
legal claim).
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not allowing the defendant to invoke collateral estoppel, the Hussein court
prevented the district court's abuse of discretion from destroying the plain-
tiff's constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial."1
4
In addition to recognizing that a court has limited discretion to deny
the right to a jury trial when a party joins legal and equitable claims, the
Hussein rationale also recognizes that the plaintiff's joinder of legal and
equitable claims was compulsory."' The plaintiff's compulsory joinder was
a significant factor in the Hussein court's determination that the defendant's
invocation of collateral estoppel infringed on the plaintiff's right to a jury
trial. 16 The Hussein court properly reasoned that courts failing to consider
whether the plaintiff's joinder of legal and equitable claims is compulsory
omit an important factor in determining whether the defendant constitu-
tionally could invoke collateral estoppel. "
7
Although the Hussein rationale safeguards the seventh amendment right
to a jury trial, the Ritter rationale promotes judicial economy by eliminating
114. See Hussein 816 F.2d 348 at 356-57 (disallowing defendant's invocation of collateral
estoppel to prevent erroneous dismissal of legal claim from denying plaintiff right to jury
trial); supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (discussing Hussein court's reasoning for not
allowing defendant to invoke collateral estoppel).
115. See Hussein, 816 F.2d at 356 (reasoning that if plaintiff had not joined legal and
equitable claims, res judicata would have barred subsequent lawsuit); supra note 53 and
accompanying text (discussing Hussein court's analysis of importance of considering whether
res judicata forced plaintiff to join legal and equitable claims).
116. See Hussein, 816 F.2d at 356 (recognizing that because of res judicata, plaintiff's
joinder of legal and equitable claims was compulsory); supra note 53 and accompanying text
(discussing Hussein court's consideration of plaintiff's compulsory joinder of legal and equitable
claims).
117. Compare Hussein, 816 F.2d at 356 (considering whether plaintiff's joinder was
compulsory in determining whether defendant's invocation of collateral estoppel violated
plaintiff's right to jury trial) with Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 988-94
(4th Cir. 1987) (failing to consider whether joinder of claims was compulsory in determining
whether defendant's invocation of collateral estoppel violated plaintiff's right to jury trial),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 260 (1984) and Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 563 (4th Cir.
1987) (refusing to apply Ritter court holding if original trial court clearly did not intend
factual findings of equitable claim to preclude new trial of legal claim). The Fourth Circuit
employs the core of operative facts test for res judicata. See Nash' County Bd. of Educ. v.
Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486-88 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that state court consent judgment
barred subsequent federal claim based on same set of operative facts), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
878 (1981). In Nash County Board of Education v. Biltmore Co., the plaintiff based a federal
claim on the same set of operative facts as a previous state claim. Id. at 488-89. The Fourth
Circuit stated that the claims alleged the same wrong and involved identical facts and evidence.
Id. The Nash court held, therefore, that even though the plaintiff brought the actions under
two different statutes, res judicata barred the subsequent federal claim. Id. In Ritter the
plaintiff's joinder of claims was compulsory because the plaintiff based the ADEA, EPA, and
Title VII claims on the defendant's dismissal of the plaintiff and, consequently, res judicata
could have barred any subsequent claim that the plaintiff failed to bring in the same original
action. Ritter, 814 F.2d at 989-90 (explaining underlying facts of ADEA, EPA, and Title VII
claims); supra note 74 and accompanying text (analyzing factual basis of plaintiff's claims in
Ritter).
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the need for a new trial on the plaintiff's legal claims." The Ritter rationale
allows the defendant, after a district court erroneously has dismissed a legal
claim and determined factual issues of a joined equitable claim, to collat-
erally estop the plaintiff from retrying the issues of the legal claim to a
jury. 1 9 The Ritter rationale, therefore, saves the judicial system and both
parties the time and expense of a jury trial on the legal claim.
20
Similarly, the Ritter rationale promotes judicial economy by eliminating
the plaintiff's need for an interlocutory appeal.' 2' The United States Code
allows an interlocutory appeal before final judgment if an interlocutory
appeal materially would advance the case. 122 An interlocutory appeal unduly
could delay the trial, however, by requiring the circuit court to hear the
parties argue the merits of the case. 12a If the Ritter court had held that the
defendant could not invoke collateral estoppel, either the plaintiff would
have received a new trial of the legal claim, or the plaintiff could have
made an interlocutory appeal, which materially would have advanced the
case by preserving the plaintiff's right to a jury trial and eliminating the
need for a new trial on the legal claim. 124 By receiving the right to a new
trial or by making an interlocutory appeal, however, the plaintiff would be
placing a burden on judicial economy.' 21 By holding that the defendant
could invoke collateral estoppel, however, the Ritter rationale does not allow
the plaintiff a new trial of the legal claim. 26 Under the Ritter rationale,
118. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (stating advantages of defendant's invocation of collateral
estoppel); supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing Ritter rationale's advantage of
promoting judicial economy).
119. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 992 (holding that defendant constitutionally could collaterally
estop relitigation of issues essential to plaintiff's legal claim); supra notes 81-93 and accom-
panying text (discussing Ritter court's analysis of constitutionality of defendant's invocation
of collateral estoppel).
120. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (stating that by granting defendant new trial, court
excessively would burden judicial economy); supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Ritter court's analysis of effect of disallowing defendant's invocation of collateral
estoppel).
121. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (reasoning that by disallowing defendant's invocation of
collateral estoppel, court eliminates need for interlocutory appeal); supra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text (analyzing how Ritter court's rationale prevents interlocutory appeals and
retrials of plaintiff's legal claims).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
123. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (stating that interlocutory appeal unnecessarily would
burden judicial economy); supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing interlocutory
appeal as consequence of giving plaintiff right to retrial of legal claim).
124. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (stating that if defendant could not invoke collateral
estoppel, interlocutory appeal could be proper to protect plaintiff's right to jury trial); supra
note 88 and accompanying text (discussing Ritter court's statement that by granting retrial of
erroneously dismissed legal claim, court would create need for interlocutory appeal).
125. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (stating that by granting plaintiff a retrial, court would
create need for interlocutory appeal); supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that by
giving plaintiff right to new trial, courts excessively would burden judicial economy).
126. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (reasoning that because court does not grant retrial of
legal claims, plaintiff has no need for interlocutory appeal); supra note 88 and accompanying
text (discussing Ritter court's analysis of effect of granting plaintiff retrial of legal claim).
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therefore, the district court's dismissal of a legal claim that the plaintiff
joined with an equitable claim would not require an interlocutory appeal
to determine whether the dismissal was erroneous. 27
In addition to promoting judicial economy, the Ritter rationale encour-
ages parties vigorously to litigate claims.' 28 If an equitable determination
could not constitutionally collaterally estop the relitigation of a legal claim
that the district court erroneously dismissed, a new trial of the legal claim
would be necessary. 29 By requiring a new trial on the legal claim, courts
would diminish both parties' incentive effectively to litigate the equitable
claim. 130 Because the Ritter rationale requires equitable determinations to
be binding on subsequent legal actions, however, the Ritter rationale does
not necessitate a new trial of the facts common to both the legal and
equitable claims.' a The Ritter rationale, therefore, encourages the parties
effectively to litigate the equitable claim.
3 2
Although both the Hussein rationale and the Ritter rationale have
strengths, the Hussein rationale is preferable to the Ritter rationale for three
reasons."' First, the Hussein rationale properly applies the Parklane Court's
principles to protect the right to a jury trial without overburdening judicial
economy.3 4 The Ritter rationale, in contrast, indiscriminately extends the
Parklane Court's holding to new and different fact situations at the expense
of the seventh amendment guarantee to a jury trial. 13 By addressing only
127. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (analyzing effect of granting plaintiff retrial of legal
claim); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing Ritter court's reasoning that
interlocutory appeal would be proper to protect plaintiff's right to jury trial of legal claim).
128. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (noting that by allowing defendant to invoke collateral
estoppel, courts would encourage enthusiastic litigation of claims); supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text (discussing Ritter court's analysis of effects of holding).
129. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (noting that if court holds unconstitutional defendant's
invocation of collateral estoppel, plaintiff would be able to try legal claim before a jury);
supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that Ritter court acknowledged
that collateral estoppel would benefit judicial economy).
130. See Ritter 814 F.2d at 991 (during bench trial, parties would realize that reversal of
district court's dismissal of legal claims would necessitate new trial before jury of factual
issues common to both legal and equitable claims); supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text
(explaining Ritter court's reasoning that by disallowing defendant's invocation of collateral
estoppel, court would encourage parties effectively to litigate claims).
131. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (noting that one trial of facts common to legal and
equitable claims was sufficient); supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text (explaining Ritter
court's ruling that defendant constitutionally could invoke collateral estoppel).
132. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (reasoning that by holding that defendant constitutionally
could invoke collateral estoppel in legal action, courts encourage parties zealously to litigate
equitable claims); supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing Ritter court's list of
benefits of holding).
133. See infra notes 134-53 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of Hussein
rationale).
134. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (stating that Hussein court applies
Parklane Court's holding to protect right to jury trial).
135. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text (noting that Ritter too easily disposes
of plaintiff's right to jury trial).
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whether an equitable determination constitutionally could collaterally estop
relitigation of the issues in a subsequent and separate legal claim, the
Parklane Court failed to address whether, if a plaintiff properly joins legal
and equitable claims, an equitable determination constitutionally could
collaterally estop relitigation of factual issues on the remand of the same
legal claim.136 Moreover, in Parklane an erroneous dismissal of the legal
claim did not deny a party the opportunity to have a jury trial of the
factual issues of the legal claim. 3 7 Furthermore, in Parklane, the Supreme
Court recognized that when a plaintiff joins legal and equitable claims, the
trial court whenever possible should exercise discretion to preserve the right
to a jury trial on the facts common to both the legal and equitable claims. 135
Although the district court in Ritter erroneously dismissed the legal claim,
the Ritter court could have exercised discretion to protect the right to a
jury trial by disallowing the defendant's invocation of collateral estoppel
and denying the motion for summary judgment on the remanded legal
claim.13 9 In Ritter, however, the Seventh Circuit described the defendant's
invocation of collateral estoppel as unfair, but failed to protect the plaintiff's
right to a jury trial on the remanded legal claim."4° The Ritter rationale,
therefore, inappropriately extends the Parklane Court's holding.' 4'
Second, the Hussein rationale is better than the Ritter rationale because
the Hussein rationale applies Parklane's principles to the facts of each
individual case. 42 The Hussein rationale realizes that the concerns of col-
136. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 324-25 (1979) (considering only
subsequent and separate legal claim); supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text (discussing
Parklane Court's consideration of whether equitable determination could collaterally estop
relitigation of identical issues in subsequent and separate legal claim).
137. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324-25 (explaining facts of Parklane); supra note 14 and
accompanying text (reviewing facts of Parklane, which did not involve joinder or district
court's erroneous dismissal of legal claims).
138. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 334 (recognizing that in joined legal and equitable claims,
courts rarely should deny right to jury trial of legal claim); supra notes 13-27 and accompanying
text (discussing Parklane Court's holding that equitable determination constitutionally could
collaterally estop relitigation of issues in subsequent legal claim).
139. See Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 989 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting
that trial court erroneously interpreted EPA and ADEA); supra notes 72-73 (discussing Ritter
court's determination that EPA and ADEA apply to religious institutions).
140. See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 991 (referring to district court's erroneous dismissal of legal
claim denying plaintiff's right to jury trial of legal claim).
141. See id. (applying Parklane Court's principles and holding that defendant constitu-
tionally could invoke 'collateral estoppel); supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text (discussing
Ritter court's adherence to Parklane Court's holding that equitable determinations constitu-
tionally could collaterally estop relitigation of issues in subsequent legal claim).
142. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 333-37 (reasoning that plaintiff constitutionally could
invoke collateral estoppel); supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text (reviewing Parklane
Court's reasons for allowing equitable claim to collaterally estop relitigation of identical issues
in subsequent legal claim); see also supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (noting that
Hussein court applied facts of case to determine if previous valid judgment existed and if
right to jury trial outweighed judicial economy).
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:271
lateral estoppel can outweigh the importance of the right to a jury trial.1 43
The Hussein rationale, however, determines on a case by case basis the
infringement on the right to a jury trial and the benefit to judicial econ-
omy. 144 For example, in determining that collateral estoppel unconstitution-
ally infringed on the right to a jury trial, the Hussein court considered both
that the joinder of claims was compulsory and that if the district court had
not erroneously dismissed the legal claim, the plaintiff would have had a
right to a jury trial of the legal claim. 45 The Hussein rationale, therefore,
better applies the Parklane Court's principles by exercising discretion to
preserve the seventh amendment guarantee to a jury trial.
146
Third, the Hussein rationale is better than the Ritter rationale because
the Ritter rationale overstates the burden that a court would place on
judicial economy by declaring unconstitutional the defendant's invocation
of collateral estoppel.' 47 On many interlocutory appeals, the circuit court
would not have to hear the parties argue the merits of the case. For
example, the circuit courts in both Hussein and Ritter remanded the cases
for trial because the district courts erroneously interpreted the statutes on
which the plaintiffs based the legal claims.148 Interlocutory appeals in Hussein
and Ritter, therefore, would not have required the parties to argue the
factual issues of the case. 49 The interlocutory appeals, instead, only would
have required the circuit courts to interpret statutes. 50 Furthermore, by
requiring a retrial of the factual issues common to both the legal and
143. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text (analyzing Hussein court's balancing
of importance of right to jury trial with interest in judicial economy).
144. See Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 354-56 (7th Cir. 1987)
(conducting fact specific analysis to determine that defendant constitutionally could not invoke
collateral estoppel); supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (reviewing Hussein court's
factual analysis).
145. See Hussein, 816 F.2d at 356 (recognizing res judicata as factor in weighing interest
in judicial economy against importance of right to jury trial); supra notes 111-17 and
accompanying text (analyzing Hussein court's consideration of res judicata).
146. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 333-37 (reasoning that interest in quick and efficient
resolution of claims could outweigh importance of right to jury trial); supra notes 13-27 and
accompanying text (reviewing Parklane Court's reasons for allowing equitable claim to collat-
erally estop relitigation of identical issues in subsequent legal claim); supra notes 111-17 and
accompanying text (noting that Hussein court conducted fact specific analysis in attempting
to exercise discretion to preserve plaintiff's right to jury trial on legal claim).
147. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text (reviewing Ritter court's reasoning
that by allowing invocation of collateral estoppel, court eliminates need for new trial and
interlocutory appeal).
148. See Hussein, 816 F.2d at 352 (noting that trial court erroneously interpreted §
1981); Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 989 (noting that trial court erro-
neously interpreted EPA and ADEA), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 260 (1987); supra notes 41-42
and accompanying text (explaining Hussein court's holding that § 1981 applies to Egyp-
tians); supra notes 72-73 (discussing Ritter court's determination that EPA and ADEA apply
to religious institutions).




equitable claims, the courts would not sacrifice judicial economy any more
than in other situations when judicial error requires a retrial.' 5' Moreover,
the retrial's purpose would be to correct the trial judge's discretionary error
to preserve the seventh amendment guarantee of the right to a jury trial.
5 2
The courts, therefore, by creating the right to a new trial and the need for
interlocutory appeal, would not excessively burden the judicial interest in
the quick and efficient resolution of claims.Y
3
The Hussein rationale is preferable to the Ritter rationale because the
Hussein rationale examines the facts in each case and, accordingly, exercises
discretion to preserve the plaintiff's right to a jury trial of the facts
underlying the legal claim.5 4 The Ritter rationale, however, forgoes a fact
specific analysis and broadly applies the Parklane Court's holding that an
equitable determination constitutionally can collaterally estop the relitigation
of the factual issues in a subsequent legal claim.15 5 Like the Ritter rationale,
the Hussein rationale recognizes that the concerns of judicial economy can
outweigh the importance of trying the facts before a jury.5 6 The Hussein
rationale, however, weighs the constitutional right to a jury trial more
heavily than judicial economy, and, accordingly, preserves the constitutional




151. See Hussein, 816 F.2d at 356 (assessing relatively small burden that court would
place on judicial system by holding unconstitutional defendant's invocation of collateral
estoppel).
152. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (noting that by giving plaintiff right
to retrial of legal claim, Hussein rationale protects right to jury trial).
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (describing Hussein rationale's fact
specific, discretionary analysis).
155. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (explaining how Ritter rationale
indiscriminately denies right to jury trial).
156. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (stating that Hussein rationale recognizes
that interest in speedy resolution of conflicts can outweigh importance of right to jury trial).
157. See supra, notes 142-46 and accompanying text (explaining how Hussein rationale
protects right to jury trial).
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